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The  present  fragility  of  the  European  project  has  reduced  the  credit  given  to  its  considerable 
achievements, especially in intensifying the bonds across a war-torn continent and, since 1989, across 
nations divided by the Cold War. Yet while far-sighted economic policies have steered EUnification so 
far, these policies are under threat by a return in some quarters to more nationalistic sentiments and 
priorities. Generally these latter currents are seen as negative and divisive, yet, as this paper argues 
from a longer term historical trajectory and across disciplines usually themselves fractured into social 
science  and  humanities  faculties,  such  diversity  has  been  and  is  still  now  an  asset,  and,  properly 
weighted, is the one main strength which the EU has in its recovery from the present crisis which, on 
the one hand, has specific local causes but which, on the other,  cannot properly be considered apart 
from the cyclical and structural properties of globalisation. The paper then argues that policy makers, 
stakeholders  (that  is,  both  EU  populations  and  the  global  community)  should  derive  strength  and 
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The European Union: still “united in 
diversity”? 
BARNARD TURNER 
“An  Fortschritt  glauben  heißt  nicht  glauben 
daß ein Fortschritt schon geschehen ist. Das 
wäre kein Glauben” [“To believe in progress 
doesn’t mean that there’s already been any 
progress.  That  wouldn’t  be  belief”].  Franz 
Kafka, Oktavheft G (c. 1917). 
“The less you exist the more important it is to 
make  a  clear  impression”.  Arthur  Miller, 
Incident at Vichy. 
Introduction 
With  the  spectre  of  a  deep  economic 
recession haunting Europe and much of the 
world,  the  will  to  empower  centralized 
administrations to deal with its recurrent (and 
perhaps  systemic)  problems  has  been 
increasingly evident. The oft-heard call is that 
the European Union (EU) must pull together, 
and  restrain  the  egregious  or  the  extreme, 
whether at the national level or among some 
of its more privileged classes. In the post-2004 
phase of EUnification, ratiocination has been 
reified  around  themes  deemed  most 
pertinent  to  the  continued  prosperity  of 
Europeanization
1 as project, and to this end 
rationalization has been very much the order 
of the day. 
Almost two-thirds of a century ago, in 
his 1947 “Marshall Plan” speech at Harvard, 
the  US  Secretary  of  State  put  forward  a 
reasoned solution to the European problem: 
                                                      
The views expressed in this working paper are personal 
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the institutions or organisations that they 
represent, or the views of the EUC. 
1Of course, definitions of this abound and sometimes 
conflict.  Johan P. Olsen’s definition can be taken as 
instructive for the purposes of the present discussion: 
“Europeanization . . . involves enlarging the territory, 
developing new institutions of political governance and 
adapting existing domestic institutions into a larger 
coherent order, as well as exporting European 
institutions beyond the region”.  Europeanization 
therefore, like its corollary and antecedent concept, 
Americanization, has both internal and external 
dimensions. 
The  remedy  seems  to  lie  in  breaking  the 
vicious circle and restoring the confidence of 
the European people in the economic future 
of  their  own  countries  and  of  Europe  as  a 
whole.  The  manufacturer  and  the  farmer 
throughout  wide  areas  must  be  able  and 
willing  to  exchange  their  product  for 
currencies, the continuing value of which is 
not open to question.  
      Aside from the demoralizing effect on the 
world  at  large  and  the  possibilities  of 
disturbances  arising  as  a  result  of  the 
desperation  of  the  people  concerned,  the 
consequences to the economy of the United 
States should be apparent to all. It is logical 
that the United States should do whatever it 
is able to do to assist in the return of normal 
economic health in the world, without which 
there  can  be  no  political  stability  and  no 
assured peace. 
    (Hindley 1998, p. 53) 
While  some  of  this  may  seem  uncannily 
familiar to those who feel compelled to watch 
the ongoing Greek financial (and increasingly 
social)  drama,  the  differences  should  be 
apparent  too.    Now,  alongside  the  US,  it  is 
China and some other major trading partners 
of the EU which abide the appropriate time to 
act;  now,  while  political  stability  may  be  a 
concern, at least in some member states, this 
is more generally to be felt at the ballot boxes; 
and now, while rioting may also be a concern, 
for the near future at least a war emanating 
from and extending across Europe is not very 
likely.  
Yet  for  all  the  success  of    post-war 
western  Europe,  the  reasons  for  its 
achievements  are  over  determined  and 
contentious: the relative weightage given to 
the  “European  Recovery  Plan”,  to  divergent 
local conditions, far-sighted social free market 
thinking  in  several  states  (most  notably  of 
course in Germany), the European Coal and 
Steel  Community,  and,  lastly,  to  exogenous 
factors  (such  as  the  Cold  War,  and  the  
beginnings of the latest phase of globalization) 
still  offers  matters  of  debate  about  the 
successful expansion of six states to twenty-
seven (and perhaps soon to some thirty). Not 
only its motto but also its intractable reality 
makes the EU a Union in and of diversity.    
EUC Working Paper No. 5 
3 
 
The EU Centre in Singapore is a partnership of: 
Such  diversity  was  already 
foreseeable in the late 1940s, of course, when 
the  Soviet  Union opted out  of  the  Marshall 
Plan  and  strongly  encouraged  its  partner 
states to follow suit.
2  While Europe, from the 
outside,  could  be  seen  as  united  in 
devastation, the effects of this first note of 
post-War  division  can  be  traced  to  that 
diversification still noticeable today, not least 
in  the  sentiment  of  the  “solidarity  deficit” 
between the more western and more eastern 
states,  even  if  in  most  recent  times  this 
“deficit”  has  been  offset  by  the  remarkable 
rise of certain new member states (NMS) and 
the  declining  fortunes  of  many  of  the 
northern Mediterranean littoral states.  
In  the  post-war  years,  economic 
integration  gathered  pace  and  increasingly 
shaped itself in the globalization of markets 
and trade, if not in mindsets and ideological 
prisms,  which,  then  as  now,  had  some 
problems  accommodating  the  economic 
intersections  into  more  culturalist  visions. 
Winston  Churchill,  in  his  1948  Llandudno 
speech  to  the  Conservative  Party,  famously 
envisaged  three  political  circles  (the 
Commonwealth [and still then, for a while at 
least,  the  Empire],  the  Anglophonic  world 
[largely  perhaps  a  way  of  including  the  US 
without conceiving of it as a distinct category] 
and  Europe)  which,  he  opined,  if  combined 
would  be  unassailable  in  confronting  any 
threats. He intimated as assailant the still not-
yet  formed  Soviet  Union,  but  competitive 
thinking today might similarly place East Asian 
                                                      
2 The photograph on the cover, from the German 
Federal Archives, shows the Berlin HQ of the “German 
Economic Commission” (Deutsche 
Wirtschaftskommission, DWK), established by the 
Soviets in 1947 (the same year as US Secretary of State 
George Marshall’s Harvard speech and slightly earlier 
than Monnet’s overtures to integration) for  the 
“Occupation Zone” to coordinate several socioeconomic 
areas, including agriculture, energy and external trade; 
in 1949, with the founding of the GDR, it became part of 
the “provisional government.” After use in the years 
after reunification by the Treuhandanstalt, the agency 
responsible for privatizing GDR industry, and today 
named after that agency’s first, assassinated director, 
the building now houses the German Finance Ministry. 
The banner to the right can be loosely translated as 
“Two Year Plan: Jobs and Bread; Marshall Plan: Ruin and 
Need.”      
economic might  as one of  the threats  now.  
Writing  about  the  same  time,  Karl  Jaspers 
could  put  together  a  global  vision—the 
Achsenzeit or “axial age”—out of three pivotal 
cultural  movements  across  Eurasia  which 
were  scarcely  conscious  of  each  other.  The 
connections  and  impingements  of  these 
circles  in  the  later  decades  to  the  present 
inform  self-conceptions  of  nations  and 
individuals in a much more complex mapping 
of  cultural,  social  and  of  course  economic 
inputs and outputs.  
In the early 21
st century, the urgency 
has  appeared  pressing,  and  the  potential 
great, to “think European” as political entity, 
and  this  long-held  prerogative  of  emperors 
and dictators is now assumed by much more 
benign  forces  in  Brussels.  Yet  thinking 
European,  a  hallmark  for  the  European 
Commission, is not of course, exclusive to it, 
nor even very demanding except as in political 
terms.  It is perhaps unjust to criticize the EU 
administrations  for  their  “deficits”  as  their 
main task is as yet to expunge by much more 
progressive forces of conviction those vestiges 
of  neo-imperialism  which  might  seem  to 
permeate  any  pan-European  project.  We 
should not expect too much of this generation 
of EU politicians in this regard, nor from them 
in shaping a new perception which has gelled 
across many generations and to which change 
resistance is increasingly apparent. Too often 
it  seems  that  people  are  being  obliged  by 
some  external  agency  to  change  their 
perceptions  without  being  given  a  palpable 
concomitant  reason,  or  demonstrable  good 
which might enhance their circumstances; this 
dichotomy,  following  Walter  Benjamin,  is 
unproductive.
3   
“United in diversity”: an overview  
There  is  then  nothing  exceptional  about 
thinking  European,  as  many  average 
Europeans  have  done  this,  or  even  been 
forced to do this, for generations. Travel and 
language  learning  have  characterized 
European life for the past 50 years at least, 
                                                      
3 One cannot change one’s opinions without “getting a 
hold of one’s circumstances” (“ohne *ihre+ Verhältnisse 
anzugreifen” *Benjamin 1936, p. 364+).  
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and even if the Cold War placed clear limits 
on  both,  and  even  if  both  the  experiences 
gained by travel across the EU and Europeans’ 
general  linguistic  abilities  are  sometimes 
exaggerated, young adults in 2011 can begin 
to  think  of  Europe  cohesively  in  ways 
unfamiliar to many earlier  generations,
4 ways 
which — following Newton’s laws of motion 
perhaps
5 —  will  make  them  more  critical  of 
Europeanization as it has come down to them, 
as  it  can  often  be  seen  as  abstruse, 
technocratic and uninspired.  Such a critique 
is  of  course  not  always  negative,  even, 
conversely, it may properly be regarded as an 
impetus to make Europe a better place for all, 
and  thus  a  welcome  sign  of  a  deeper 
engagement with the project.   
With  all  the  emphasis  on  strategic 
cohesion,  however,  that  diversity  which  has 
always  characterized  Europe  and  which  is 
inscribed  in  the  Union’s  motto  (“united  in 
diversity”) has been somewhat short-shrifted, 
with the pressing need absolving the Union of 
long deliberations. Yet while the motto both 
makes  a  “virtue  of  necessity"  (diversity  is 
indeed  increasing,  not  only  with  the 
increasing number of member states but with 
                                                      
4 In a 1968 book, Anthony Sampson commented: “The 
young Europeans may not take the idea of ‘making 
Europe’ as seriously as their elders; with no memories of 
war, the talk of reconciliation is just boring.  But they are 
able to live Europe much more casually, to pick up 
movements far more quickly, and to have a common 
aim, at least, in wanting to get rid of the Old Europe. It 
may not be quite the kind of aim that their parents had 
in mind [the first figure Sampson talks about in his book 
is Jean Monnet]; but then nothing in Europe has worked 
out quite as planned” (244). Forty-plus years on, the 
“casual” approach is the norm, and in certain respects, 
1969 has slipped to “the old Europe”.  As Goethe writes 
in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (vol 1 cha. 
12): ”Gewöhnlich zerstreut der Sohn, was der Vater 
gesammelt hat, sammelt etwas anderes oder auf andere 
Weise. Kann man jedoch den Enkel, die neue Generation 
abwarten, so kommen dieselben Neigungen, dieselben 
Ansichten wieder zum Vorschein” *Usually the son 
scatters what the father has collected, collects 
something else or in other ways. If one however can 
await the grandson, the new generation, so the same 
inclinations, the same opinion reappear”+. 
5 Fear of inertia has often driven the European project 
(cp. law 1); the net force (ability to do useful work) of 
the EU is seen as inversely proportional to the number 
of members (cp. law 2); the greater the impetus for 
Europeanization, the greater the reaction to it (law 3).   
their several fates and economic trajectories, 
etc.) and demarcates the ethos of the EU from 
that of the United States (“e pluribus unum” 
*“from  many,  one”+),  diversity  itself,  once  a 
good, is now more perceived as a problem, a 
recalcitrant  or  recidivist  attitude,  one  to  be 
overcome.    Yet  such  cohesion  is  politically, 
economically  and  socially  dilatory,  as 
divergences mark the EU well beyond those 
most  cited  and  debatable  (the  “democracy” 
or  “solidarity”  deficits,  for  example).  
Geography has been destiny across millennia, 
and regional sub-divisions continue to inscribe 
themselves into attitudes to the other, be this 
to  a  Gypsy  encampment,  to  “the  South”  or 
“the  North,”  the  Balkans,  the  Baltic,  the 
Nordic realm, Germanic Europe or the United 
Kingdom (UK).   
The essence of the European spirit is 
its dialogicity. It may take time for solutions to 
be constructed and in a volatile international 
situation  with  a  plethora  of  independent, 
exogenous  variables;  it  may  seem  to  a 
perhaps  often  sceptical  international  press 
that  a  positive  strategy  is  lacking.  Yet  such 
dialogicity does show a strength of the Union, 
an attendance to a historical legacy that is not 
easily gainsayed (and not least in the service 
of  the  limited  strategic  policy-oriented 
thinking of the present, or by the rather short-
termist  commentary  on  current  headlines 
which  can  sometimes  substitute  for  a  more 
comprehensive, longer-term and nuanced but 
therefore not byte-sized analysis). When the 
attention to a “single voice” takes precedence 
over  the  recognition  of  diversity,  policies 
often need to be formulated according to a 
“lowest  common  denominator”  to  avoid 
counter-productive disagreement. Norms are 
streamlined and nuances painted out.  Policy 
may be more pointed but it is less variegated 
and  therefore  less  open  to  alternatives, 
differences  which  can  of  course  be  of  an 
advantage  in  any  negotiations  since  the 
discourse  partner  may  need  to  muster 
defences and alternatives to a wider range of 
proposals.  A  dichotomy  therefore  arises 
between ostensible cooperation which would 
be  more  a  vehicle  for  one-sided  norms 
transfer on the one hand and a partnership of 
equal respect and engagement on the other.  
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Even  the  most  recent  reassessments  of  the 
EU’s  relations  with  its  neighbours  (for 
example, the Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared  Prosperity  with  the  Southern 
Mediterranean  [March  2011]  and  the  New 
Response  to  a  Changing  Neighbourhood 
review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
[May  2011])  highlight  unity  over  diversity, 
even  though  the  basics  of  a  “differentiated 
approach”  (Partnership,  p.  2)  are  becoming 
more evident. The insistence on “unity” over 
“diversity” can hold the EU, and some of its 
member states, up to a certain ridicule for its 
excessive interventionism; the press (and not 
only  in  the  UK)  can  stoke  the  public’s 
bemused, even flabbergasted reaction to the 
details, as seen in comments over such trivia 
as cucumbers and the EU/Council of Europe 
logo (“flag”) on national teams’ shirts, and so 
on. 
The EU: a success story of integration and the 
movement towards cohesion? 
And yet for all these diversities, EU integration, 
if not unnecessarily accelerated or deepened 
too  far,  has  been  a  considerable  success.  If 
public  opinion,  in  the  sense  of  a  positive 
appreciation of  the EU, has not risen much in 
the past forty years or so, it has not declined 
either, as it might have been expected to do 
as  the  EU  deepens  (“spills  over”)  to  many 
other  socioeconomic  sectors  and  becomes 
more visible across the sub-continent.
6  More 
specifically,  for  all  the  angst  currently  in 
circulation about the eurozone, the currency 
has given the sub-continent a firm basis from 
which to face and accept the future.   Of the 
top  20  nations  on  the  World  Economic 
Forum’s  Global  Competitiveness  index  for 
2011, eight are in the EU. Of the top 10, six 
are  Union  countries,  three  in  (Finland, 
Germany,  and  the  Netherlands)  and  three 
                                                      
6 I use this term to refer to the territory covered by the 
27 member states and those countries included in their 
circumference, in distinction both to the EU itself and 
the other countries, generally to the east of this 
circumference,  which are usually (since Peter the Great) 
taken as part of Europe the continent in geographical 
terms.  The EU, then, in this estimation and with these 
definitions, is held to have been of great benefit not 
only for the member states but also for the region so 
defined. 
outside  (Sweden,  Denmark  and  the  UK)  the 
eurozone. If we add Switzerland (number 1) 
and  Norway  (number  16),  the  European 
subcontinent  remains  in  the  vanguard  of 
global  competitiveness, with  half of  the  top 
20 in Europe.
7   
The talk of Europe’s demise appears 
therefore premature, and the strength of the 
Union,  a  hallmark  of  its  conception  in  the 
Marshall Fund days, is still its ability to work 
together and to remain in the global premier 
league.    Economist  Intelligence  Unit  PPP 
numbers may show that the EU27’s share of 
world  GDP might  fall  from  20.8  per  cent  in 
2007  to  15.6  per  cent  in  2030,  while, 
conversely, China’s might rise from 10.1 per 
cent to 22.7 per cent (Grant 2010, p. 65). In 
2030, the EU’s share of the world’s population 
might slip from some 10 per cent in 2007 to 
some  7  per  cent  then,  while  China’s  might 
remain stable at around 20-22 per cent. In per 
capita terms therefore, the EU (and its leading 
economies)  might  well  still  then  be  leading 
world  contenders.    The  EU  then,  and  the 
pseudo-factuality  of  such  forecasting 
notwithstanding,  might  still  be  in  the  top 
league.  Long-term competitiveness of course 
remains  an  issue,  for  even  if  richer  EU 
members can help out weaker ones with their 
debt-related  problems,  competitiveness 
differentials persist, even if these are not as 
yet  such  a  fatal  blow  to  EU  prosperity  as 
Martin Feldstein might opine.
8   
                                                      
7 Clearly however there is great disparity across the 27 
member states with one-third falling into the mid-range 
of global competitiveness according to the rankings.  Yet 
such is of course also the case with the United States 
and other federations with which, at least in this respect, 
the EU could be compared. 
8 Feldstein made the point in an interview at the 
September 2011 Ambrosetti Forum Villa d’Este in 
Cernobbio. At the same forum, both he and Hans-
Werner Sinn predicted a partial break-up of the 
eurozone, and Sinn further remarked that a “two-tier” 
Union was being shaped. While such a layering can 
perhaps be envisaged (and Sinn’s Munich think tank is 
instrumental in such formulation), such distinctions have 
been with us for a while, and have been manageable at 
the national level in member states with “north-south” 
economic divides.  Part of the original, and abiding 
mission of the EU is to gradually overcome them; that 
they still exist is of no discredit to the Union, nor 
therefore a cause for excessive pessimism for the Union  
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The  euro:  a  means  of  both  cohesion  and 
fragility 
The fragility of the euro has been so much in 
the media eye of late that it is needless here 
to  rehearse  the  apparent  causes.  Yet  such 
ambivalence  has  a  lengthy  history,  and  it  is 
surely  premature  to  doom  the  whole 
enterprise  of  EUnification  because  of  the 
problems  of  a  few  years.
9   In March 1998, 
while  Minister  President  of  Niedersachsen 
and some six months before he was elected 
German  Chancellor,    Gerha rd  Schrőder 
claimed that “the overhasty monetary union 
has  led  to  a  sickly  premature  birth”  *“Die 
überhastete  Währungsunion  hat  zu  einer 
kränkelnden  Frühgeburt  geführt”+    (Middel 
1998).  Yet,  a  few  years  later,  in  the 
Chancellor’s office, he revised his opinion. In 
December  2001,  shortly  before  the  euro 
entered  into  circulation,  he  opined:  „Hinter 
dem  Euro  steht  eine  der  stärksten 
Wirtschaften der Welt. Das macht ganz klar, 
dass  an  der  Stabilität  dieser  Währung 
überhaupt  nicht  gezweifelt  werden 
kann“  *“Behind  the  euro  stands  one  of  the 
world’s  strongest    economies.  That  makes 
quite clear that there can be no doubt about 
the  stability  of  this  currency“+    (“Das 
wichtigste Gesicht“ 2002).  
                                                                             
as a whole. Greece may have slipped down the Global 
Competitiveness Index over the past 8 years, but Poland 
is doing markedly better and Hungary has turned itself 
around in a short time.  The 2004+ enlargements have 
perhaps stretched the definition of a rich and poor EU 
state, and left the weaker pre-2004 states in limbo; add 
the distinctions of national business cycles, the 
extremely rapid growth Greece and Spain experienced 
(which cannot be used as  a benchmark for long-term 
growth), and the inability of a eurozone state to 
unilaterally devalue its currency (as effectively the 
eurozone itself could do by buying “safe” currencies 
until and unless these currencies’ central bankers follow 
the Swiss example), and the problems currently facing 
Greece could have been foreseen. 
9 It may seem a little reckless in late 2011 to cast the 
euro as an example of the EU’s success, but it has been 
instrumental in the convergence across the EU of 
economic zones and sectors across regions. Its nominal 
effective exchange rate (i.e. as measured against 20 
major partner currencies) is still at average levels.  The 
rather maligned euro is the world’s second reserve 
currency, representing some 26 per cent of the world’s 
holdings, double that of the composite currencies 
together in the year or so before its introduction.     
 
That,  from  a  vantage  point  two 
decades  on  and  at  a  time  when  many 
question Germany’s commitment to the euro, 
the  1998  pronouncement  appears  more 
prescient than the later one, is not to say that 
it will remain so for even a comparable period 
of three years from 2011. Calls for Greece to 
leave the eurozone can be offset against the 
resounding  late  September  2011  Bundestag 
vote in favour of raising financial support for 
the European Financial Stability Facility.  
In  December  2001  the  euro’s  trade 
weighted value was some 10 per cent under 
its  hypothetical  value  of  March  1998,  if 
somewhat higher than its lowest ever levels 
of third quarter 2000. By September 2011, it 
is generally on par with the trade weighted 
index  of  early  1999,  just  after  entry  level 
equivalencies  to  the  original  national 
currencies joining the euro were set, and thus 
has held steady, after increasing egregiously 
in 2007-08, even while economies with lower 
per capita GDP (in some cases, significantly so) 
have  entered  the  europact  and  even  under 
the strain of the recent financial torque.  The 
USD’s  trade  weighted  index  against  other 
leading  currencies  has  of  course  generally 
declined over the last decade, so the euro’s 
relative strength against it is not as revealing 
as  its  weightage  against  the  Swiss  Franc, 
clearly  an  important  currency  for  the  euro 
since the Federation is the EU’s fifth largest 
trading  partner.  While  the  CHF  1.20  to  the 
euro threshold, set in September 2011 by the 
Swiss  National  Bank,  may  seem  on  the  low 
side for the euro which since its introduction 
had been trading in the CHF 1.50 range, a rate 
at  about  CHF  1-30-1.40  would  still  be 
compatible  with  what  might  have  been 
expected  for  the  evolution  of  the  Swiss 
currency, given prevailing CHF-DM exchange 
rates  in  the  mid  late  1990s,  and  given  that 
presumably  weaker  economies  have 
progressively been admitted to the eurofold.
10 
The September threshold shows that the euro 
is as yet holding up,   even after the almost 
                                                      
10 A helpful website is at the Sauder School of Business 
at UBC: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/plot.html.  The CHF has 
increased of course against other currencies (USD, CAD, 
SGD), in some cases to a comparable or even greater 
extent.    
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daily  dire  news  from  the  EU  about  the 
financial shape of the eurozone.   
Convergence  through  decreasing  energy 
intensity 
Several  EU  states,  older  members  and  new 
member  states  (NMS)  alike,  have  made 
remarkable  progress  in  bringing  down  the 
energy  intensity  of  their  economies  in  the 
past quarter century or so.  The UK (London at 
least) has successfully relaunched itself as a 
post-industrial  site,  with  the  lower  energy 
intensive  service  sector  foregrounded. 
Germany  and  Denmark  have  halved  their 
energy  intensity  and,  essentially  post-1989, 
Hungary  and  the  Czech  Republic  have 
followed  suit,  with  Poland  and  the  Slovak 
Republic being even more successful.  (OECD 
Factbook 2010).
11 While there does seem to 
be at present a threshold for energy intensity 
(around 0.1 tonne of oil equivalent to produce 
US$1,000 of GDP, in year 2000 terms) below 
which a developed country cannot advance, 
and which has practically been reached about 
a third of the EU states, the decline does bode 
well for Europe’s future competitiveness and 
growth. A primary measure of an economy’s 
sustainability, oil consumption in the EU has 
remained steady for the past dozen years or 
so,  while  it  has  increased  substantially 
elsewhere  (US  Energy  Information 
Administration).   
The frangibility of a technocratic, 
economistic Union 
However,  while  such  production  indicators 
may argue for a certain cohesion of material 
input  and  hence  of  a  narrower  range  of 
outputs, not being a true federal state, the EU 
does  not  [yet]  have  the  generally  agreed 
mechanisms  to  help  out  when  bounded 
(temporally and/or geographically) economic 
problems arise of a more financial nature. In 
federated states, such problems as those of 
Greece at present may be subject to political 
brinkmanship, but those of an economy which 
provides  only  some  2  per  cent  to  the  total 
GDP  are  unlikely  to  be  considered  serious 
                                                      
11 China is of course another case of remarkable 
lowering of energy intensity over the period, from high 
volumes in the early 1980s 
enough  to  destabilize  the  whole  federation 
itself.
12 The problem therefore i s structural, 
rather than budgetary as such.  
Bo Stråth (2005, p. 267)  has claimed 
that  “there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the 
European Union as an economic project and 
as  political  and  social  project”.  Production 
indicators,  calls  for  greater  competitiveness 
and  other  trajectories  of  “mere”  economics 
enter  the  lifeblood  of  the  populace  only 
indirectly,  as  the  numbers  themselves  say 
little  to  human  experience.  Article  I-3(2)  of 
the  Constitutional  Treaty  talked  of  the 
importance  of  “free  and  undistorted 
competition”  as  an  objective  of  the  Union, 
even  if  the  Lisbon  Treaty  toned  down  this 
style of neoliberal absolutism (cp.  Tortolano 
and Medhurst 2011).     
The  pace  of  integration,  and  its 
profiling in the media (and, needless to say, in 
academia),  have  been  very  fast,  for  all  the 
short-circuits, integration fatigue and pauses 
for  reflection  along  the  way.  This  pace  has 
been  relentlessly  kept  up  as  if  integration 
were a means of confronting the spectre of 
declining  influence  (a  bogeyman  of  which 
most Europeans seem blissfully unaware, but 
which has been constructed as impetus, need 
and agency for integration) or an exaggerated 
desire  to  put  the  EU,  rather  than  its  major 
players, on the world stage, a desire which in 
some quarters could be seen as intemperate 
and  self-serving.    Thus,  as  in  the  theses  of 
Alexander  and  Margarete  Mitscherlich  or 
Sergey  Karaganov,  rapid  economic 
transformation  had attempted to deal with 
haunting  spectres  from  the  past  without 
transforming public and “elite” attitudes, so, 
more  generally,  Europeanization  expunges 
Europe’s own traumas in what an influential 
mythopoeia of our time would imagine as a 
post-colonialist,  multi-polar  (or  even  apolar) 
world. 
  In a September 2011 opinion piece, 
Karaganov notes three errors which show up 
the gulf between those who would push on 
with integration and those who would step on 
                                                      
12 Here California is a helpful cross-comparison, even if 
its contribution to the US economy is some six times 
that of Greece to the EU.  
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its  brakes.  First,  a  premature  drive  to  a 
common  foreign  policy  “for  which  the 
Europeans  were  not  ready”,  and  through 
which  influence  was  to  leave  the  national 
capitals  but  which  has  not  been  firmly 
articulated  through  the  responsible  EU 
institution;  second,  a  premature  desire  to 
include  as  much  of  Europe  as  feasible,  and 
thus  to  exert  heavy  social  costs  in  the  new 
member  states,  and  by  which  an  increased 
range  (widening)  has  produced  more  friable 
structure  (less  densely  packed  with  firm 
support across and down the social layers for 
continued  integration);  and  third,  the 
premature introduction of the euro with the 
consequences debated at such length in the 
media  (Karaganov  2011).    While,  as  argued 
above,  the  last  at  least  of  these  objections 
may even today be a little exaggerated (and 
Karaganov’s own country is a valid example of 
overcoming a debt crisis), these endeavours 
have  run  the  risk of  loosening  the  ties  that 
bind, or increasing the components or players 
in  the  system  without  strategizing  them, 
leading then to pockets of inertia and entropy 
(the inability to do useful work), and thereby 
introducing system irregularities which, at the 
very least, take time to discuss away.   
Cleavages  are  therefore  perdurable. 
To present these as a (or worse, the) problem, 
and  to  offer  etiologies  and  other  heuristic 
devices  to  proffer  solutions,  to  see  policy 
optimization  responses  as  if  to  “hard” 
bounded (temporally or causally) phenomena, 
is to reify the “problem situation” (Checkland 
and  Scholes  1999)  and  to  run  against 
dominant  strains  in  both  methodological 
epistemology  and  basic  phenomenology.    In 
one of many claims that show the importance 
of familiar humanities methods for the new 
sciences,
13 Checkland and Scholes (1999: A28) 
                                                      
13 Including of course the social sciences.  Cp. “Discursive 
approaches” to European integration (Wæver, Diez) and 
approaches through “political myths” (Stråth 
*“Integration became a buzz word with a high political 
charge” 263+, Bostanci, Jones, Manners *“Europa global” 
82]).  Yet there is still work to be done: Jones says that in 
writing about myths he is “outside his comfort zone as a 
political economist” (2010, p. 90) and Manners expects 
his readers to agree that it is “strange to begin a 
consideration of the EU in world politics through 
reference to Greek mythology” (2010, p. 68); the myth, 
opine:  “Neither  problem  situations  nor 
problem types can be classified and made the 
basis  of  pigeon  holes  into  which  particular 
examples  can  be  slotted,  for  one  person’s 
‘major issue’ or ‘serious problem’ may well be 
another’s unruffled normality”.
14  
Diversity across member states and the 
Union’s response 
Such diversity of responses is shown in Table 
1,  which  presents  the  intersection  of  the 
voting patterns at the UN of several pertinent 
countries with the votes cast by the US over 
what had now been three US administrations 
across  the  two  major  parties.    Readers  can 
come to their own conclusions, but a specific 
EU profile is hard to measure when it comes 
to  considering  the  individual  countries: 
Ireland  is  closer  to  New  Zealand,  and 
Germany to  Norway, than  to  a  hypothetical 
EU average, here tabulated for comparison’s 
sake. While there has been some convergence 
to  this  average,  this  has  to  be  seen  in  the 
general  trend  towards  homogeneity  across 
these  nations  and  to  a  great  extent  to  the 








                                                                             
of course, is that of Europa and the bull.  A Confucian 
“rectification of names,” a profiling of terms like Europe 
and Asia as fundamental to area studies, social sciences 
and humanities, seems not strange but critical and 
essential if clarity is to be achieved in what is still loosely 
called “European Studies” and even more in that 
unclassifiable pursuit, “Asian Studies.” 
14 This is not of course a new idea, or one whose import 
is confined to scientific communities. In the 1915 
manifesto on the “Futurist Synthetic Theatre,” 
Marinetti, Settimelli and Cora argued that, with all the 
overdetermination of an event, one can never seize 
(“afferrare”) an event entirely, “with all its causes and 
consequences, because reality vibrates around us, 
assailing us with gusts of fragments of events combined 
with each other, interlaced with each other, confused, 
entangled, messed up” (“caotizzati”).  
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Despite  such  diversity  across  its 
constituent  states,  and  the  increasing 
homogeneity  of  responses  to  global  issues 
across the “West” (which makes the specific 
EU response difficult to demarcate), the EU’s 
External  Action  Service  is  attempting  to 
position itself in a role as agenda setter in the 
name of the world’s largest economy. To this 
end  there  is  often  of  course  an  internal 
dimension,  to  get  the  member  states  on 
board  and  to  ensure  that  public  opinion 
coincides with their objectives, in (rare) cases 
where  national  party  cleavages  would  run 
along  pro-/anti-EU  lines.    In  this  effort  the 
Service  can  be  seen  to  sacrifice  extensive 
multilevel  dialogue,  both  with  stakeholders 
and  in  manner,  and  thus  truncate  the 
intersubjective  field  in  which  long-term 
problems  are  to  be  solved.    Too  often, 
especially in the external press,
15 “the EU” is 
hypostatized  into  a  crystalline,  monolithic 
entity, which in some way suits its burgeoning 
self-reflection as such a corporation. However, 
in  this  process,  the  functions  which again in  
 
                                                      
15 Here the ASEF-funded “Perceptions of the EU in East 
Asia” project is insightful. 
 
the popular imagination, the Union serves are 
often fudged: in ongoing problem situations 
(and  it  is  not  necessarily  to  the  Union’s 
discredit that it seems to be in continual if not 
continuous  crisis),  “the  EU”  (by  which  is 
meant its institutions) appears as “client” and 
“problem  solver”  while  the  “problem 
owners”—those in the widest range affected 
by  the  problem,  Alfred  Schütz’s  Folgewelt
16 
included—are  narrowly  conceived  as 
equivalent  to  the  clients  (politicians, 
financiers and the like) (Checkland and Winter 
2006,  p.  1437).  While  in  some  soft  systems 
methodology such an amalgam is defensible, 
its  combination  in  this  context  can  give the 
impression  that  the  Union  is  perpetually 
solving problems it itself has caused, among 
which of course is the financial crisis in the 
eurozone:  were  member  states  able  to  set 
monetary  policy,  including  exchange  rates, 
etc., the argument goes, the situation might 
not have been exacerbated. 
Yet,  just  as  any  dynamic  system, 
which conforms to the norms of the adaptive 
cycle  (Holling 2001;  Walker  et al  2002), the 
                                                      
16 That is, the world as we imagine or would like it to be 
experienced by our successors.  
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state of present EU economic equilibrium, or 
of its extensible trajectory, presents to us a 
complex of variables or intersecting vectors, 
leading to asymmetric effects across the EU 
space,  at  different  scalar  immensities  and 
cyclicities, such that “EU-wide” problems (and 
arguably  including  the  present  crisis)  are 
infrequent.  While  there  may  be  some 
correction downwards to Europe’s economic 
position  as  globalization  becomes  truly 
widespread (“global”), the Union at present is 
surely  resilient  enough  to  cope  with  most 
exogenous  shocks,  or  those  of  its  own 
devising.
17 Much  was made of the slow-down 
in German GDP growth (to 0.1 per cent q-on-q) 
in Q2 2011 (to give a  1.4 per cent increase for 
1H 2011), yet a longer term view would see 
not  only  that  price -adjusted  values  were 
historically high but that such growth is still 
holding steady in the ripples of the  ongoing 
crisis;
18 indeed, the low growth must be seen 
in the context of relatively high growth in 
2010 and of a scenario in which the country 
has enjoyed “integer value” (i.e. 1.0 or more) 
growth  in  only  four  quarters  in  the  past 
decade (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 
“Gross domestic product”).  Germany’s export 
dependency is a source of potential weakness, 
and  its  own  adaptive  capacity  should  be 
increased  to  deal  with  any  downturn  in 
demand for high-end goods. To ward off one 
foreseeable problem is to leave oneself open 
to others, and to protect an economic state at 
any  particular  moment  runs  foul  both  of 
experience (a short reflection on the inherent 
volatility of a socioeconomic system) and of 
an appreciation of the generalizable zero-sum 
structure  of  capitalism  (again,  the 
                                                      
17 As with any “soft system,” however, localized 
improved resilience (which might even in the EU be seen 
as national protectionism) can have detrimental effects 
elsewhere in the system.  For example, increasing 
German disposable income by reducing top-level tax 
could decrease the fiscal inability to take up a 
commensurate share of any financial support for more 
fragile economies.   
18 1H 2011 German exports grew 14.7 per cent over the 
already encouraging 1H 2010 figures, with trade 
balances firmly in the country’s favour (Statistisches 
Bundesamt Deutschland, “Außenhandel 1. Halbjahr 
2011”). 
perception
19 overrides the reality), accord ing 
to which in order for there to be gains a 
mechanism is to be found to produce losses.   
The history of the successive phases 
of European integration (and there have of 
course  been  other s,  religious,  secular, 
culturalist,  benign  and  aggressive) 
demonstrates that a phase of expansion is 
followed by one of contraction or realignment 
during which the previously acceptable status 
quo is still active in the general imagination. 
Whether  these  phasal  structures  be  called 
(following Holling et al) “adaptive cycles” or 
(following Victor Turner etc) breaks through a 
liminal  or  liminoid  state,  limits  cannot  be 
placed  to  that  period  of  reflection  through 
which  an  accommodation  to  (or  indeed 
rejection of) the new is processed.  
The  eurozone,  a  bold  political 
initiative which would produce a state, which 
is to say a set of bounded, intersecting social, 
political  and  economic  institutions  which  is 
also  present  as  a  state  of  affairs,  an 
Alltagswelt [everyday, lived experience world] 
in Schütz’s terms, cannot dispel its inherent 
dynamism  as  a  collection  of  such  states  (in 
both  senses),  the  reproduction  of  which  on 
the  higher  phase  level  of  national 
socioeconomic disturbances might have been 
foreseen even without its construction as part 
of the cyclicity of capitalist accumulation and 
dispensation.  While  of  course  such 
disturbances are real and troubling, the very 
logic which would consider their inevitability 
would also predict a return to an equilibrium 
of sorts, even a growth spurt for those parts 
of the system which can profile themselves in 
the  emergent  system  which  arises  in  the 
aftermath.  In this scenario, “stress tests” are 
of  habitual  occurrence,  in  fact  part  of  the 
activity itself. In such socioeconomic systems 
as  banking  and  finance,  just  as  in  social 
ecological  systems,  therefore,  a  short-term, 
even if relatively frequent disturbance should 
not  obfuscate  the  view  of    the  underlying 
trend or cyclicity of flows (inputs, outputs and  
                                                      
19 Conversely, of course, one could point to an ideology 
which sees sustainable development and growth as a 
win-win situation.  
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resultant  changes)  which  can  be 
accommodated  by  a  theory  attentive  to 
“slowly  changing  variables  and  their 
feedbacks” (Carpenter and Gunderson 2001: 
457)  into  which  theoretical  horizon  such 
disturbances  can  be  accommodated  and  for 
which  general  planning  (along  the  lines  of 
“lowest regrets” or the Micawber Precept
20)  
is  generally  sufficient  to  ensure  long-term 
positive  growth.    While  the  figures  being 
suggested for an effective eurozone “rescue” 
are indeed daunting, these should be put in 
some context: in mid-September 2011 sums 
amounting  to  some  2  trillion  euros  were 
mooted, with the participation of the IMF; the 
EU’s annual GDP amounts to some six times 
that.   
Trends  in  labour  mobility  and  housing  as 
indicators of embedded social and economic 
diversity within the EU 
What is good for the EU may not then seem 
so  to  its  people.  While  a  Special 
Eurobarometer  337  report  on  Geographical 
and  Labour  market  mobility  (June  2010) 
showed that 60 per cent thought that labour 
mobility  was  a  good  thing  for  European 
integration, only 36 per cent thought it was 
good for families. Since of course integration 
without  the  “four  freedoms”  would  be 
unthinkable, the support level is unsurprising 
(the support does not track preferences for 
integration itself), but the antipathy to labour 
mobility  demonstrates  that  personal 
economic  survival  is  pitted  against  general 
“survival” or well-being of the EU as such, if 
one  policy  (labour  mobility)  cannot  be 
adjusted  to  another  (falling  fertility  rate). 
Comparing the results of its survey with one 
held in 2005, Eurobarometer 337 shows that, 
generally  speaking,  support  for  “moving 
across  regions  or  countries”  of  the  EU  had 
held steady (but only to 48 per cent in the 
later survey), while people had become less 
undecided (from 37 per cent to 31 per cent), 
and apparently those who had made up their 
mind  had  come  to  the  opinion  that  it  was 
“bad” (from 11 to 17 per cent).   
                                                      
20 Advice which, of course, as readers will remember, he 
failed to keep himself. 
The EU — as lived environment and as 
amalgam of institutions — has a long way to 
go  to  make  itself  family-friendly.    While 
managers, students and the young (under 24, 
especially males) are the most ready to move 
to another region or country, other people—
that is, the overwhelming majority—express a 
certain and in some cases decided reluctance 
to  relocate  (Eurobarometer  337:  93).    Age, 
gender and education therefore present other 
cleavages  in  the  assessment  of  EU  value 
added.    With  the  prevalence  towards  one-
child  families  (if  any  [families  or  children]), 
females  may  feel  a  traditional  bind  to  the 
parents,  while  males  can  indulge  a  certain 
Wanderjahr  or  two.   Thus  ironically one EU 
policy,  freedom  of  movement  (which  has 
generally  been  considered  one  of  the 
advantages of the Union), is made easier by 
that which enhances it, the low fertility rate 
(itself  a  complex  consequence  of  social  and 
economic  forces),  but  which  itself  puts  the 
Union at a disadvantage.   
Such a diverse picture is apparent in 
housing  also.    Some  of  the  new  member 
states [NMS] have very high home ownership 
rates,  as  do  several  of  the  countries  in  the 
public eye of late (for example Spain [c. 85 per 
cent] and Portugal), while France, Austria and 
especially Germany (c. 55 per cent) lag behind 
(Eurostat 2010b, p. 332; see also Chaney and 
Emrath 2006 and OECD 2005).  The German 
housing  price-to-income  ratio  is  well  below 
the  long-term  average
21 and nominal house 
prices there have in anything been slipping for 
the  past  decade  ( OECD  Economic  Outlook 
2011/1 Statistical Annex:  401) while those in 
Spain  increased  some  40  per  cent  between 
2002 and 2006, to deflate rapidly (some 15 
per cent between 2007 and 2010) as the crisis 
arose.    In  early  2010,  Deutsche  Bank 
considered Germany’s house price-to-income 
ratio  “cheap”  while  Spain’s  (as  much  of 
western Europe’s) was “elevated” (Deutsche 
Bank  Research:  7).    In  Purchasing  Power 
Consumption  Standards,  expected  rental 
returns  have  been  higher  in  Spain  than  in 
Germany  (OECD  Economic  Outlook  2011/1), 
                                                      
21 74.9 per cent in 2008 and 76.3 per cent in 2010 (OECD 
Economic Outlook 2011/1 Statistical Annex:  402).    
EUC Working Paper No. 5 
12 
 
The EU Centre in Singapore is a partnership of: 
but  Germans have, and  generally use, more 
disposable  income  than  residents  of  many  
European  countries    (Eurostat  2011;  Carlin 
and Soskice 2009) especially as housing rents 
have  been  rising  comparably  more  slowly 
than  other  consumer  prices  (Voigtländer 
2010).   Loan-to-value mortgage figures mean 
that this surplus is needed for a mortgage, in 
the  right  market  conditions.    In  other 
conditions, of course, it can be used for other 
items, including an influx of imported goods 
which is cited for one reason of the slowdown 
of  German  GDP  growth  in  2Q  2011 
(Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2011). 
Housing  loan-to-value  percentages  have 
generally  been  lower  in  Germany  than  in 
many other European countries, so a higher 
level  of  savings  (and  thus,  in  a  sense,  of 
disposable income if buying one’s own place 
is out of the picture) is to be expected.  Since 
rental properties are often of a relatively high 
standard and other fundamentals are sound, 
renting is a viable lifestyle option across the 
socioeconomic range. While such figures may 
seem of little intrinsic interest to the current 
paper’s argument about attitudinal diversity, 
they do set such diversity in a precise socio-
economic  background  and  go  some  way  to 
presenting  a  background  reason  for  the 
diversity  of  attitudes  to  growth,  consumer 
society and public welfare across the member 
states here mentioned. 
The  Union’s  abiding  problems  of  entering 
citizens’ hearts and minds  
 “Efficacity,”  in  Léopold  Sédar 
Senghor’s  appraisal,  that  “virtue  of  the 
north,”  most  “characterizes  “Albo-European 
civilization”,  but  this  is  an  asset  which  the 
culture  cannot  always  claim  for  itself.  The 
echoes  of  central  planning  inherent  in  the 
Lisbon  Treaty  (e.g.  the  EEAS  and  the  new 
regulations  with  regard  to  external  trade) 
would  give  credence  to  an  ongoing 
centralization. Yet asymmetries are to persist, 
most of which are structural: for example, in 
energy  and  finance.    Such  diversity  — 
including  the  recovery  from  a  downturn  –
fuels  growth,  as  input  (infrastructure, 
knowledge,  material)  is  restructured  across 
the  Union  and  growth  areas  appear  and, 
admittedly, disappear, only to be given more 
input as the crisis becomes more evident and 
its  aftermath  is  taken  as  an  opportunity  to 
focus  on  procedures  for  sudden  (and 
sometimes too hasty) growth once more.   On 
the  other  hand,  the  EU  has  not  been  so 
efficacious  in  becoming  a  part  of  what, 
following  Schütz,  might  be  called  the 
residents’ Umwelt (except at times negatively, 
when  it  is  considered  intrusive)  for  all  the 
attention  earlier  in  the  century  on  getting 
“Europe  closer  to  the  people”  and  to  its 
ecological  agendas.    At  best,  it  enters  the 
realm  of  the  “they”  (not  the  “us”  of  the 
Umwelt), the Mitwelt alongside but not part 
of our lives, Heidegger’s “das Man”.   
Public  opinion  and  related  data  sets 
are generally ambivalent about the degree to 
which  Europeanization  has  entered  the 
mindsets  of  Europeans  themselves  over  the 
years.   Of course, following Newton’s third 
law  (loosely,  the  one  about  “equal  and 
opposite  reactions”),  an  elite  trajectory  of 
such  Europeanization  might  lead  to  a 
negativity  about  it,  or  might  translate  into 
trivial domains, some offshoots of pre-existing 
national  or  regional  trends,  such  domains 
then  being  unnecessarily  taken  as 
demonstration  of  the  effects  of  such  elite 
Europeanization.  Trends  from  a  range  of 
sectors, human interests and lifestyle choices 
can  be  assessed  to  build  a  composite  and 
thorough  picture  of  diversity  across  social 
status,  income  level  and  age,  and  then  of 
course across nations.   
Media  attention  to  an  issue  can 
prefigure public interest.  Even if a concern is 
unquestionably important in its own terms, it 
can be pushed out when other issues arise on 
the front pages.  In 1982, Eurobaromètre 17 
(1982,  p.  36-7)  found  that  while,  in  those 
volatile Cold War times, 67 per cent of the ten 
Community states thought that the protection 
of  the  peace  was  an  cause  “sufficiently 
worthwhile”   to “do something about, even if  
this might involve some risk or giving up other 
things,” and 40 per cent  similarly valued the 
ending of poverty and the maintenance of the 
freedom of the individual, just over a third (35 
per  cent)  would  act  in    protection  of  the 
environment    (“Climate  change”  still  meant  
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global cooling then) and a mere 11 per cent 
for  European  unification.  While  climate 
change was sore-thumbed as a concern in a 
2007 Eurobarometer survey (at 57 per cent, 
the  highest  percentage  by  some  20  points 
over the second), in 2011 it had slipped to 34 
per cent, about par with around half of the 
issues  listed  in  the  survey  (Special 
Eurobarometer 365: 14). In the broader term, 
while a 2 degree rise in global temperatures 
may  precede  disaster,  an  equivalent 
quantitative  decline  in  Europe’s  economic 
ranking — and at present, this is really all it 
is
22 — is hardly worthy of a strong stance or 
even much historical attention, at least in the 
medium term.   
The potentially debilitating, but coalescing 
power of globalization through 
Europeanization 
While  the  causes  of  the  financial  crises, 
serious though they of course are, seem still 
within  the  (albeit  exponential)  limits 
predictable  of  economic  volatility,  some 
political commentary takes their effects as of 
a greater order of magnitude (the logarithms 
of the Richter scale come here to mind).   The 
rhetoric of competitiveness fuels this anxiety, 
as many a downturn (or even a serious, but 
temporally bounded recession) is seen as the 
beginning of the end of the EU as a project.  
Fortunately, worst-case scenario planning (as 
about  climate  change  or  budget  default 
scenarios)  combines  with  limited  public 
attention  spans  (Downes  1972,  p.  39
23) and 
                                                      
22 Following data given earlier in this paper. 
23 “Each *problem+ suddenly leaps into prominence, 
remains there for a short time, and then—though still 
largely unresolved—gradually fades from the center of 
public attention” (Downes 1972 p. 38; my italics). That 
this “center” is largely politicized is abundantly 
demonstrable in relation to climate science/speculation, 
as in the ongoing debate, rekindled in mid-2011 with the 
publication of CERN (Geneva) data supporting a link 
between galactic cosmic rays and condensation 
nucleation (Kirkby et al 2011), and the attendant 
discussion of a pronouncement by CERN’s director that 
he had asked his colleagues “to present the results 
clearly but not to interpret them” (that is, to forego the 
usual Discussion section common to scientific articles) 
so that the Conseil would not be obliged to enter “that 
arena, one of high politics, of the climate change 
discussion” *“Ich habe die Kollegen gebeten, die 
Ergebnisse klar dazustellen aber nicht zu interpretieren. 
high information costs to undermine any such 
debilitating public concerns.  Europeans then 
might be united more than they are generally 
aware by the presence of media campaigns, 
and even if public opinion surveys show that 
such campaigns are limited in maintaining a 
singular public awareness. 
High on the agenda of such concerns, 
it  might  seem,  would  be  globalization,  a 
presence  and  buzz-word  in  so  much  that  is 
deemed newsworthy. In 2005, Eurobarometer 
63 found that a small majority of Europeans 
felt  more  anxious  than  optimistic  about 
globalization:  18  per  cent  of  respondents 
found  “globalization”  synonymous  with 
“increased  competition  for  national 
companies” and 38 per cent were concerned 
about  relocation  of  companies  to  places 
where  costs  were  cheaper.    Southern 
economies, some (but by far not all) newer 
member states and states new and old with 
larger populations and less developed welfare 
regimes were more likely to throw a flag on 
globalization’s play.  Not surprisingly then, a 
negative  concern  was  much  more  voiced  in 
the  then  “EU15”  (40  per  cent)  than  in  the 
“new  member  states”  (26  per  cent).  France 
and Belgium seemed particularly anxious, the 
former recording a 59 per cent of that opinion. 
In  2009,  according  to  Eurobarometer  72 
(published 2010), France remained the most 
pessimistic about globalization, a full 70 per 
cent saying that it “constitue une menace” for 
the  country  (the  EU27  average  was  42  per 
cent, one percentage point lower than those 
who  thought  globalization  “a  good 
opportunity”).    
                                                                             
Damit würde man sich sofort in die hochpolitische Arena 
der Klimawandeldiskussion begeben. Man muss sich 
darüber klar sein, dass es sich bei der Höhenstrahlung 
nur um einen von sehr vielen Parametern handelt“+. 
(Welt-Online). A similar tone was struck at the March 
2009 Climate Change Congress by Danish PM Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen (the following month to resign to head 
NATO), who “gave“ the eminent scientists present a 
“piece of advice,“ that they not give policy makers too 
many “moving targets, because it is already a very, very 
complicated process. And I need your assistance to push 
this process in the right direction, and in that respect, I 
need fixed targets and certain figures, and not too many 
considerations on uncertainty and risk and things like 
that” (Kammen 2009).  
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Here  the  background  of  extra-EU 
merchandise  exports  is  instructive  (Eurostat 
2010a).  In 1995, France enjoyed a 15 per cent 
of total EU exports, and Germany 26 per cent 
(Italy,  for  comparison’s  sake,  had  12.6  per 
cent). In 2010, Germany’s share had increased 
to 28.09 per cent; France’s had slipped to 11.4 
per cent and Italy’s to 10.7 per cent.  While, 
clearly, one would expect a decline as more 
member  states  join,  the  Eurostat  figures 
accommodate  for  this  by  back-tracking  
member  states’  export  figures  before 
accession also (a slight adjustment is however 
required for the 2007 accession countries, not 
reflected  in  the  1995-2002  data).  Germany 
has  in  the  period  experienced  perhaps 
exceptional  export-oriented success, but its 
10 per cent rise from 1995 to 2010 is only part 
of  the  picture,  since  most  countries’  figures 
are rising, France, Italy and the UK being the 
main exceptions, other countries much in the 
news recently being flat or with slight declines. 
Certain countries export extra-EU by a factor 
much  greater  than  their  population  as  a 
proportion of the total EU; Germany again is 
significant  here,  but  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands  could  also  be  mentioned. 
Conversely,  there  is  room  for  expansion  in 
several countries. It has sometimes been said 
(and denied) that the success of one EU state 
in this endeavour is at the (literal) expense of 
another, but, if structural funds continue to 
flow  in  the  spirit  of  solidarity  from  the 
“winners”  to  the  “losers,”  economic 
infrastructure can be built up in the latter and 
the  figures  reflect  more  equality  in  the 
connection between national population size 
and total GDP (i.e. GDP per capita would be 
more equal across the EU). As it happens, of 
course, at present this is not the case. 
Europeans  have  rarely  seen 
Europeanization as a holistic act which would 
bring together a host of domains.  As Zürn and 
Checkel  (2005:  1075)  opine,  “National-level 
socialization  at  times  competes  with,  and 
often  dominates,  European  processes”.  Not 
only  this,  in  this  abstract  sense,  but 
Eurobarometer  74  (2011)  shows  that, 
generally  speaking,  there  is  a  direct 
correlation between proximity of  an issue to 
the  concerns  of  average  people  and  their 
tendency to want national, rather than “joint” 
(with  the  EU)  decision-making.    The  nation 
therefore will remain, literally, closer to their 
hearts.    While  a    comparison  of  figures  for 
2007  and  2010  (pre-  and  mid-crisis)  shows  
that people are generally becoming aware of 
the EU-level’s importance  in fighting inflation, 
other important issues should still, in people’s 
estimation, be handled nationally.  Of the 20 
categories  listed,  of  the  eight  garnering 
around two-thirds support,
24 three (education, 
taxation  and  pensions)  fall  under  the 
“nationality” column, and four (anti-terrorism 
research,  environmental  protection  and 
defence and foreign affairs) under the “joint” 
column.    Another  six  categories  or  so  are 
more or less equally divided between the two 
headings.    Taxation  and  fiscal  policy  are 
decidedly in the “nationality” column, with an 
increase from 65 to 68 per cent from 2007 to 
end-2010.  
While  both (and conversely) greater 
national  freedom  over  monetary  policy  and 
more Union-level intervention in the banking 
sector  or  national  fiscal  policies  have  been 
advanced as positive solutions to the current 
financial  crisis,  it  would  of  course  be  a 
simplistic  move  and  a  hypostastisation  to 
ignore  the  range  of  variables  which  make 
each country’s (and even subnational regions’) 
resilience and exposure to the crisis (or rather, 
a  series  of  international  crises  again  with 
different  causalities  and  scalar  intensities) 
unique. For example, the UK banking sector 
holds more claims on foreign banks than any 
other EU country, but only around a quarter is 
formed of claims on other European countries 
(the norm is about a half). While its offshore 
claims  are  some  30  per  cent  higher  than 
France’s  (the  second  ranking  European 
country  in  this  regard),  the  UK’s  European 
claims are only some 60 per cent of France’s 
(Bank of International Settlements June 2011 
newsletter  statistical  annex).
25  Thus 
Europeanization may be a valid hook to an 
                                                      
24 That is, those issues about which the population can 
be said to have reasonably decided views, either for 
national or united, quasi-federal responses.. 
25 “Foreign claims are defined as the sum of *banks’+ 
cross-border claims and local claims of foreign affiliates” 
(Bank of International Settlements, “Highlights” 11).  
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internationalization  of  one  member  state’s 
economy, but too narrow to be such a spur to 
globalization for another’s. 
Nationalism  still  and  increasingly  evident 
across the Union 
Nationalism  is  therefore  imprinted  into  the 
currency, as into the currency of opinion.  The 
2010  Manifesto  of  the  Spinelli  Group
26 and 
other Euro-focused optimists have confidently 
asserted  that  “nationalism  is  an  ideology  of 
the  past”.  Yet  a  strident  assertion  is  not  a 
proof, and indeed this statement reeks of the 
counterfactual if assessed according to a basic 
empiricism.    As  reflected  in  Eurobarometer 
surveys  and  the  like,  people  seem  to  like 
nationalism. In 2002, Eurobarometer 57 asked 
for  people’s  opinion  should  the  EU  be 
“scrapped”. Only 38 per cent said they would 
be “very sorry”, most saying that they would 
either be indifferent or, a minority but over 10 
per cent, saying they would be relieved.  Not 
unexpectedly,  Luxembourgers  would  be  the 
most sorry (but even here around a third took 
opposing views), followed by the Italians and 
the  Portuguese;  as  may  be  expected 
(although it is really a caricature), the UK led 
those who would be the least unhappy, but 
more  Finns  and  Swedes  opined  that  they 
would either be relieved or indifferent. While 
of course this does not argue for a return to 
nationalism itself, when factored against the 
relative low assessment of membership of the 
EU  in  several  countries,  and  the  rise  of  the 
eurosceptical  right  in  recent  years,  the 
context of nationalism is definitely prevalent.  
Many  people  still  think  of  the  polis  as  the 
nation,  and  think  of  the  nation  as  the  only 
begetter of social good. 
In 1982,  Eurobaromètre  17, striking 
out in an incipient self-confidence, began to 
ask  what  has  become  a  series  of  related 
questions  about  individuals’  feeling  of 
European citizenry, and the relation between 
                                                      
26 A manifesto which, of course, pays homage to that 
written in 1941 on Ventotene by Altiero Spinelli and 
Ernesto Rossi. While the 2010 document pales in 
comparison with the urgency and compulsion of this 
earlier work, it cogently spells out the views of several 
distinguished European politicians, some academics and 
others.  
national    and  European  identity.  The  first 
findings showed a scatter of responses which 
has become a hallmark of diversity within the 
unity of the framed question. 16 per cent of 
those  polled  across  the  then  10  member 
states  felt  themselves  “citizens  of  Europe”; 
yet, discounting perhaps the 33 per cent of 
Luxembourgers which expressed this opinion, 
and the euphoria of new member, Greece (27 
per  cent),  only  Germany  (25  per  cent)  and 
France  (19  per  cent)  exceeded  the  average; 
the German figure is perhaps rather surprising 
given  that  one  third  of  its  current  (2011) 
territory lay in the opposing Soviet bloc.  Still, 
one  might  take  the  wish  for  the  deed 
accomplished in the following decade. Only 9 
per cent of the Irish, 7 per cent of the Brits 
and,  the  lowest,  5  per  cent  of  the  Dutch 
expressed  a  firm  commitment  to  such 
European  citizenship.  Yet  one  can  be  a 
cosmopolitan without being a Unionist (or a 
“Common  Marketeer”  or  “Monnetist”); 
variously,  Churchill,  Thatcher  and  de  Gaulle 
might fit such a profile.  
Expanding  on  this  line  of  inquiry,  in 
1988,  Eurobaromètre  29  addressed  for 
perhaps  the  first  time  the  issue  of  the 
complementarity  of  national  and  European 
identity. Just glancing at the tables, one would 
get the impression that people are favourable 
to  complementarity,  even  if  the  results  for 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK (which by then 
had been members for a decade and a half) 
run  against  the  perception  of 
complementarity.  Ireland  is  non-committal 
and  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  are 
ambivalent, the new members (Greece from 
1981 and Spain and Portugal from 1986) show 
moderate  enthusiasm,  slightly  less  than 
Belgium’s and well below that of France, Italy 
and  (needless  perhaps  to  say)  Luxembourg.  
Yet these somewhat consoling figures need to 
be examined rather more closely. While what 
the  question  negates  is  fairly  clear  (most 
people  do  not  equate  Europeanization  as  a 
loss of national cultural good), what is being 
posited  is  less  so.  “Complementarity”  is 
derived  from  the  proposition  that  a  “true 
“unification” of Western Europe is “the only 
way  of  protecting  our  national  historic,  
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cultural identities and our national economic 
interests  against  a  challenge  posed  by  the 
great world powers.” Here, although no-one 
could have foreseen how quickly the period 
would come to an end, are apparent the fears 
and  tribulations  of  the  Cold  War,  the  view 
that  European  values  were  threatened  with 
annihilation by the Soviet Union on the one 
hand  and  with  assimilation  by  the  United 
States  on  the  other  (“globalization”  was  of 
course still fuzzy in this stereotype).    
Such can be seen in the tabulation of 
support  for  unification  which  can  be  traced 
using  Eurobarometer  data  back  to  1973  (to 
about  1990).  The  period  1973-85  is  a 
particularly helpful gauge as only one country, 
Greece,  joined  during  this  period,  and  the 
figures at the Community level are remarkably 
consistent, or even in some respects rising in 
support  of  some  form of  western  European 
unity.  In 1973, 30 per cent of those polled 
said  that  they  were  “very  much  for” 
unification,  and 33  per  cent  “rather  for”;  in 
1985, the respective figures were 35 per cent 
and  42  per  cent.  Yet  again  other  variables 
cloud  the  picture.    While  overall  the  “don’t 
knows” fall from 26 per cent in 1973 to 13 per 
cent in 1985, in several countries in the earlier 
year  the  “don’t  knows  would  have  it”  (i.e. 
they are the largest group or near it); even in 
1985, the DK vote in Denmark was 22 per cent, 
in Ireland 24 per cent and Greece (four years 
into membership)  23  per  cent.  Presenting  a 
pattern  consistent  in  later  decades,  the 
percentage  saying  that  their  country’s 
Community membership was of value did not 
increase  (from  a  relatively  unimpressive  56 
per cent) from 1973 to 1985, with a greater 
degree  of  indifference  and  a  corresponding 
decrease  of  those  who  “didn’t  know”.  Yet 
such  averaging  does  not  reveal  the 
considerable diversity across the nations, with 
some characterized by a persistent antipathy 
to western European unification (in 1985, only 
9 per cent of Danes, 24 per cent of the Irish, 
30 per cent of the Belgians and 30 per cent of 
the  British  gave  unqualified  support  to  the 
project, only 29 per cent of Danes and 37 per 
cent  of  Brits  saying  that  their  country’s 
membership was a good thing) and others by 
high general support (although, with the usual 
exception  of  Luxembourg,  the  highest 
percentage “very much for” unification, Italy, 
reached only 39 per cent).   
Eurobaromètre 73 (2010) asked how 
people  saw  themselves  in  the  near  future 
with reference to their identity, and revealed 
that  just  under  half  (46  per  cent)  think  of 
themselves only in terms of their nationality, 
the outriders, not surprisingly, being the UK 
and Luxembourg.  While one could of course 
argue that conversely more than half feel in 
some way attached to Europe, the question 
does not ask whether they feel attached to 
the  European  Union  as  such;  it  is  surely  no 
great  matter,  as  knowledge  of  other  world 
regions becomes habitual, to think of oneself 
as pertaining to one rather than another.  If 
anything, as Table 2 shows, nationalism has 
risen over the past 20 years. 
There are still social division issues to 
be  overcome  in  general  between  the  post-
2004 members and the rest which are not to 
be  reduced  to  economics  and  the  ability  to 
pay for that upgrading promised and exacted 
by  Europeanization  (cp.  Bőrőcz  and  Sarkar 
2005, p. 165-8). There are not, as far as I am 
aware,  support  figures  at  the  sub-national 
levels,  but  given  the  variation  of  GDP  per 
capita  incomes  not  only  across  states  but 
within  them  it  would  not  be  surprising  if 
support  wavered  across  subnational  regions 
also. Such wavering would be consistent with 
Marcin  Marek  Dabrowski’s  finding  that  the 
“sub-national  impact  of  EU  cohesion  policy 
remains uneven and differentiated depending 
on  the  actors'  preferences,  attitudes  and 
capacity”  (Dabrowski  2011).  Table  3  shows 
that nationalist feelings have increased in at 
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It is, arguably, the country which has 
had the greatest economic success in which 
nationalism seems to have crested.  So one 
might  argue  that  if  one  progresses  with 
integration, not letting oneself be sidetracked 
(Monnet’s principle), if one “keeps buggering 
on”  (in  Churchill’s  words),  gradually  such 
nationalism  will  fade,  countervailing  the 
tendencies  towards  recidivism  as  external 
threats are reduced. To have such confidence 
in  the  future,  and  to  believe  that  modest 























macroeconomic  super-objectives,  is  timely 
here.
27   
Whichever way the Union is therefore 
cut, and whatever its size and composition, 
support for integration
28 has remained fair to 
middling across the past four decades, some 
three quarters of the current lifespan of the 
current  form  of  Europeanization.    Some 
countries, intrinsically, essentially even, think 
themselves more European than others, for a 
                                                      
27 Readers may pick up on the theatrical terms here, 
deliberately placed as there is often as much drama in 
the discussion of coming catastrophes as in any 
production by Stanislavski or of the classical Greek 
playwrights, more “Brekekekex koax koax” than 
“otototototoi”. That many pronouncements are 
sincerely held only makes their delivery that much more 
Stanislavskian, as role-playing (actorhood) has been 
successfully internalised.  
28 “Unification” is the focus term for much of the earlier 
period, as used in previous paragraphs where thus 
consistent, after which “integration”—a more nebulous 
term and thus perhaps less imposing—has taken over.   
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range  of  over-determined  historical  and 
experiential  reasons  which  have  not  yet—
even  if  it  were  profitable  to  do  so—been 
uncovered.  Throughout,  “‘thick’  cultural 
identity” is more tenuously interlaced with a 
“‘thinner’ civic identity,” as Christopher Lord 
and  Erika  Harris  (2006,  p.  190)  contend. 
Weighing  for  relative  population  size,
29 or 
separating larger from smaller states, shows 
limited  differentiation  of  support  l evels.  
There is some general differentiation between 
“EU15”  (i.e.  those  states  which  were 
members  pre-2004)  and  “new  member 
states”  (the  subsequent  12  states  or  NMS), 
and  this  can  be  mapped  on  to  a 
corresponding cleavage between those in the 
top third of GDP per capita and those in the 
bottom third (with seven of the bottom nine 
states  in  the  latter  category  from  the  ex-
“Eastern bloc” and two-thirds of the original 
members in the former category).  
However, whether we divide by GDP 
or by pre- and post-2004 membership, there 
is considerable national variation within each 
grouping, from 36 per cent to 70 per cent in 
favour for the top nine by GDP (widening to 
29  per  cent  to  70  per  cent  if  all  pre-2004 
states are included) and 26 per cent to 62 per 
cent for the bottom nine (figures for the NMS 
as  a  group  also  fall within  this  range).  Only 
two states fall within 15 per cent either side 
of the median for the top nine by GDP, while 
five fall into such a group for the bottom nine. 
This suggests that the problems still faced by 
the  NMS  and  those  others  whose  fortunes 
have  declined  of  late  are  comparable,  the 
ways in which the look at the EU are similar, 
and economics rather than politics dominates 
public thinking about the value added of the 
EU.    This  is  not  of  course  surprising,  but  it 
does  have  implications  for  any  policy  which 
would make less tangible issues (“innovation,” 
broadband, the EU’s external image, climate 
change, etc.) a bedrock of the public outreach 
of  the  EU  as  a  pre-federalizing  body.  
Simplifying  then  greatly,  most  upbeat  and 
optimistic about the Union—and this should 
                                                      
29 Cp. Eurobarometer 32, December 1989: “The figures 
presented in this document for the Community as a 
whole are means weighted according to the countries' 
respective adult population” (p. ii). 
come  as  no  surprise  either—are  the  higher 
socioeconomic brackets, and those with more 
education  (especially  those  still  studying) 
(Eurobarometer 73 [2010], p. 142). The EU is 
perceived as an object of discussion for these 
cadres  rather  than  of  socioeconomic 
significance.  Whether or not the view of the 
EU as an elite-driven enterprise is apposite, it 
certainly appeals to those who would think of 
themselves as an elite, and this again adds a 
cleavage  to  the  perception  of  the  EU  going 
forward.  
Conclusion 
Diversity is an asset. As in economics, where 
diversity  of  business  cycles  and  price 
fluctuations  (for  example  in  stock  and 
commodity markets) can stimulate growth, so 
the EU thrives by the potential social, political 
and  economic  energy  latent  in  this 
heterogeneity.  In any case, it makes no sense 
to try to reduce diversity, as it is perdurable 
through  the  series  of  convergence  moves 
which  would  seek  to  reduce  it,  indeed  is 
perhaps  hardened  by  such  moves.    To 
recognize,  however,  in  the  potential  of 
diversity only its presumed catalytic impetus 
on  competitiveness  (for  there  can  be  no 
competition  without  the  diversification  of 
input  and  output)  is  to  hypostatize  it  for  a 
particul2ar  political  agenda.    Instead, 
solidarity  across  diversity  is  now  more  than 
ever  acute.  As  Aleksander  Smolar  opines, 
“intra-European  redistribution  played  a  key 
role  in  the  modernization  of  Ireland,  Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece” (2005, p. 57) and it is 
this  modernization  which is  under  threat  as 
the  limits  of  a  renewed  distribution  are 
discussed.    This  solidarity,  pace  Monnet, 
cannot  be  granted  by  institutions,  or  pace 
Sternberger and Habermas, by “constitutional 
patriotism” alone. As the 2005 conclusions of 
the  unfortunately  overlooked    Spiritual  and 
Cultural  Dimension  of  Europe  Reflection 
Group argue, “the intellectual, economic, and 
political  tendencies  of  recent  decades  -  not 
least the advance of individualism - have led 
to  an  erosion  of  many  forms  of  social 
solidarity.” For “when  individual solidarity  is 
not  there,  institutionally-based  solidarity  is 
not enough to bring a polity into being” (2005,  
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p.  10).  Such  solidarity  is  to  be  expressed 
mainly  as  an  attitude,  a  habitus,  a  helpful, 
open and pleasant disposition, yet with a firm 
demeanour and with above all the insight to 
foreground  people  in  the  formulation  of 
policy. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
reiterated  in  his  victory  remarks  after  the 
2011 elections, “love is more important than 
power” (“miłośd jest ważniejsza od władzy”).  
Recognizing  this,  perhaps,  would  those 
“desiring  a  better  country”
30  (and,  by 
extension, Union) be appeased. 
                                                      
30 That this, those “desiderantes meliorem patriam”, the 
motto of the Order of Canada loosely based on Hebrews 
11:14 ff.    
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